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This paper discusses the empirical case of an aging and 
obsolescent infrastructure supporting a space science 
mission that is currently approaching a known end. Such a 
case contributes to our understanding of the degrading path 
at the end-of-life of an infrastructure. During this later stage 
in the life of infrastructure we can observe common issues 
associated with aging infrastructures – hardware’s material 
decay, programming languages and software tools reaching 
end of support, obsolete managerial methodologies, etc. 
Such a case of infrastructural decay reveals how work of 
infrastructure maintenance may reach the limits of repair 
and shift from repair-as-sustaining into a mode of repair-
into-decay, actively working towards the end-of-life. What 
this reveals is that, rather than infrastructural decay being a 
natural by-product of time’s passing, there is active work 
that goes into producing a convivial decay in which the 
multiple temporalities of aging and decay are brought into 
alignment through negotiation of what aging means, its 
impacts on different forms of work, and even what counts 
as old and new. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Recent work in CSCW has turned attention to studies of 
technology that go beyond early phases of technology 
design and adoption to include “downstream” contexts of 
technology repair and maintenance [11–13,17,21,24]. 
Along with work on departures and abandonment of 
technologies  [1,10], as well as calls within sustainable HCI 
for design approaches that will take disposal into account  
[3,19], these works aim to redress a stated bias in the 
literature towards accounts of novel technologies in early 
stages of adoption. They also align with calls within 
infrastructure studies to examine the full “biography of 
artifacts” by studying infrastructures longitudinally through 
the various stages of their life cycle [15,21].  
As Jackson et al point out, this is not an entirely new focus 
for CSCW research, which has historically attended to 
invisible forms of labor that go into creating and sustaining 
technologies, from studies of articulation work [27], to 
appropriation [6], to work-arounds [5], and break-downs 
[20,29]. What all this work acknowledges is the multiplicity 
of working relations to technology that emerge over the 
lifetime of a technological object as it shifts from sites of 
design and adoption, into repair, reuse, appropriation, 
disposal, and abandonment. Given this multiplicity, there is 
value in gaining an empirical understanding of cases of 
technologies at a variety of stages in the technological life 
cycle.  
This paper focuses on the stage of life when a technological 
infrastructure is nearing its end-of-life. While others have 
examined abandoned databases [10] users abandoning 
social media technologies [1], and the disposability of  
technologies [3] there is yet to be a study of the empirical 
case of the end-of-life of an infrastructure. Such a case, I 
will argue, not only fleshes out the particular empirics of 
this stage of life, but also troubles the assumed 
temporalities of technological life cycles.  
Based on an empirical study of a degrading space science 
mission infrastructure, I find that infrastructural decay, 
rather than being a natural by-product of innovation, is 
actively negotiated alongside an emerging appreciation for 
the relative agedness of different parts of the infrastructure. 
This knowledge of agedness emerges through reflection on 
sociotechnical change not as rupture, but as drift over the 
duration of infrastructure’s multiple lifetimes. Agedness is 
not only known, but is actively performed and advocated 
for, throughout this negotiation. As infrastructural decay is 
negotiated in terms of what should decay and how decay, as 
a process, should unfold, a particular form of repair-into-
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decay emerges which I call convivial decay1. Convivial 
decay, I argue, forms a practice of alignment work [14], 
translating across multiple lifetimes, while working actively 
towards the end. 
RELATED WORK 
Much research on later stages in the life cycle of technology 
focuses on the active work of repairing, maintaining, or 
appropriating technology. This work often implicitly 
restores to technological practices the privileged status of 
design and innovation by revealing design-in-use or design-
in-appropriation [17]. Similarly, ethnographic work on 
repair demonstrates the ingenuity and creativity [17] in our 
“diverse… capacity for repair: the ability to make broken 
and breaking systems work” [13].  
This work on repair takes a fundamental epistemological 
stance that it takes active work to make “any sociotechnical 
arrangement… to work and persist through time” [13].  
While I align with this perspective that repair involves 
ongoing active work to sustain technology, I also note that 
it places emphasis on repair as a form of renewal. As 
Graham and Thrift state: “The world is involved in a 
continuous dying that can only be fended off by constant 
repair and maintenance” [8]. Change and flux are constant 
and therefore repair and maintenance are often examined as 
sites of ongoing renewal, keeping things going, to “sustain 
them for at least a little while longer” [13]. 
Sims and Henke [25] have suggested a distinction between 
repair-as-maintenance (keeping the status quo) and repair-
as-transformation (e.g. retrofitting) (cited in [26]). As Sims 
points out, both degradation and obsolescence are forms of 
“slippage” between what a system was designed to do and 
what it is able to do, either through aging of components 
that no longer perform as intended or because of changing 
demands, standards, or perceptions of performance [26]. 
Infrastructural repair in the form of upgrades, updates, 
work-arounds, etc. “are thoroughly sociotechnical 
activities” in that they “involve restoring both technology 
and social order” [26]. Determining both how a system “is” 
and what it “ought” to be like are interpretive processes that 
call on different kinds of technical and social organizational 
expertise [26]. 
This relates to the notion of “repair” derived from 
ethnomethodological studies of “conversational repair” [7] 
which have been applied as well to understanding 
technology repair-in-use [29]. In this notion of repair, it is 
the relationship between what a technological system ought 
to do (or is thought to do) and what it does that is repaired. 
                                                            
1 I appreciate one of the reviewers of this work for pointing me to 
the work of Ivan Illich who has written about conviviality of 
technological tools. While the concept has relevance to this work, 
I have drawn primarily on the work of Donna Haraway and her 
concept of livable worlds in conceptualizing conviviality.  
This can be achieved both through changes to the 
technology itself or through changes to expectations. 
However, in a case where the end-of-life of a system is 
known and impending, there is a shift in thinking about 
repair. An infrastructure entering old age and approaching 
death may have reached a time beyond repair, where, rather 
than fending off death, repair is part of working towards its 
end. Rather than a form of repair to fend off death or restore 
the status quo, I observed, in the case that follows, a shift 
towards repair-into-decay. This involves an acceptance of 
decay, through an understanding that emerges that the 
infrastructure is not what it used to be: a recognition of a 
need to slow down, let go of expectations, and make cuts to 
functionality. As in all cases of repair, this repair is still 
oriented towards extending the life of the system so that it 
does not end prematurely. But there is an increasing 
acceptance that repairs are made in an effort to decay 
“gracefully” rather than break catastrophically.  
What such a case offers, then, is an example of what 
Jackson et al has called a “recessionary informatics” –in 
which we might imagine a “fundamentally contracting 
technological world… [of] breakdown, withdrawal, and 
decline” [13] or in which we might attend as much to the 
importance of “disconnection and disassembly” as to 
“connection and assembly” in our technological worlds [8]. 
A system approaching the end of its life allows us to 
observe this downgrade path, examining repair’s ability to 
keep things going, but also the limits of repair.  
It is not surprising that there is little research on dying 
infrastructures, since we might assume that something that 
is coming to an end has little insight to offer about current 
or future practice. Yet this assumption is premised on a 
progressive account in which dying systems are those that 
have ceased to be relevant. It is also an assumption 
premised upon a future that moves towards expansion and 
greater capability, as has been challenged in [30], where 
working with more limited capabilities would have little 
value. 
This may arise from an implicit orientation within CSCW 
towards understanding sociotechnical change as an 
evolutionary process. From this perspective, technologies 
that decline and go away are those that did not succeed 
because they were unsustainable or unfit. This is a view in 
which the past is irrelevant, except as a form of historical 
narrative to understand how we came to be where we are. 
From a computational perspective, we simply outlive and 
move beyond forms of computational work that are no 
longer relevant (e.g. who wants to read/write in hex 
code?!). Obsolescence, degradation, and decay, according 
to this view, would be merely a natural by-product of 
innovation and time’s passing and would not require 
explanation on their own terms.  
As this paper will argue, this is far from the case. 
Infrastructural decay, as any form of decay, is not simply a 
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backdrop against which progress takes place. A dying 
system is not simply a forked evolutionary path that has 
reached a dead end. The dying of an infrastructure is an 
active pursuit and indeed what lives or dies in infrastructure 
is always open to negotiation. If there is something we 
might deem infrastructural decay it is composed of multiple 
lifetimes of different parts of the system – hardware, 
software, code, organizational processes, programming 
languages, institutions, careers – all of which are entangled 
and are aging or obsolescing at different rates. 
Infrastructural decay is not a natural or essential process of 
falling away, but rather an outcome or achievement made 
through active moves and cuts within these entangled 
lifetimes. In the case that I describe, what emerges is an 
understanding of “convivial” decay in which the relations 
across these multiple lifetimes are negotiated so that the 
infrastructure can age gracefully. 
METHODS 
This paper presents findings from nine months’ 
ethnographic fieldwork examining the work of engineers to 
maintain and operate a large-scale, multi-decade 
technological infrastructure, built to support a space science 
mission (hereafter referred to as the Mission) at a major 
laboratory in southern California (hereafter referred to as 
the Lab).  This infrastructure supports the science and 
engineering teams at the Mission in their work to 
meaningfully operate and command a spacecraft that is 
currently in orbit around Saturn for the purpose of scientific 
data collection.  
Designed and built in the 1980s and 90s, and launched in 
1997, the spacecraft reached Saturn in 2004 and has 
conducted scientific data collection across twelve different 
scientific instruments. In addition to the spacecraft itself, 
which has “on board” software for flight and instrument 
operations, the infrastructure includes the “ground system” 
comprising software tools for designing and coordinating 
science observations and for sending commands to the 
spacecraft.  
The Mission organization includes scientific teams 
distributed across the US and Europe who participate in 
selecting, designing, and implementing scientific 
observations. The team at the Lab comprises both 
disciplinary scientists conducting Saturn science as well as 
the engineers who operate and command the spacecraft as a 
whole, as well as several of its instruments.  
My initial questions that motivated the fieldwork were 
focused on how software tools mediate distributed 
collaborative work and translation across disciplinary 
boundaries. This motivation informed my methods, which 
included interviews with engineers working in different 
disciplines from navigation, spacecraft operations, science 
and mission planning, and software development; 
shadowing of work practices; attending formal and ad hoc 
meetings; and walk-throughs of software tools.  
Data collection included semi-structured interviews with 30 
key informants from across different teams at the Mission 
(navigation, engineering, science planning, e.g.) as well as 
participant observation across these different teams. These 
observations included dedicated time (3-4 weeks) with each 
team as well as observations that followed a particular work 
product (a sequence of science observations) through the 
Mission workflow process. I was present for 3-4 days a 
week at the organization and sat in on approximately 200 
formal and informal meetings. 
As I realized the salience of the long-livedness and 
agedness of the infrastructure, I began to incorporate 
interview methods drawn from oral histories methods to 
discover more about how the infrastructure and the 
mission’s work had evolved over the years, particularly for 
engineers who had spent many years on the mission. I 
returned for follow up interviews with key informants, 
asking them about their work at the Mission within the 
context of their career and how the Mission and its 
infrastructure had evolved over the duration of their work 
there. 
A GERIATRIC INFRASTRUCTURE 
At the time of my fieldwork, the Mission was one of the 
only outer planet missions in operations at the Lab, 
considered a “flagship” mission both in terms of the size of 
its distributed scientific community and in terms of budget 
and personnel at the Lab. It was also immediately apparent 
upon arriving for my fieldwork that the Mission is one of 
the oldest on the Lab that is still in operations. It was often 
referred to as a “dinosaur” or a “well-oiled machine” – 
terms that denoted both frustration and pride about the fact 
that the mission has its own way of doing things. The 
software team was continually fending off pressure to 
upgrade to newer centrally developed Lab-wide systems or 
failing in their attempts to do so. Some engineers who have 
spent a decade or more on the Mission are accustomed to 
computing work that would be difficult to find still 
practiced elsewhere, such as manually reading hex code, or 
coding in tcl.tk. 
The Mission is in fact comprised of several phases each of 
which comprised its own mission plan and bid for funding 
to NASA.  It entered its third phase in 2010 after being 
granted a final extension of the mission. It was during the 
transition from the middle to final phase of the mission in 
2009-2010 that I conducted my fieldwork. The final phase 
lasting from 2010-2017, while seven years long, was 
approved for a reduced budget and so this transition 
involved cuts to funding and personnel (most of whom 
moved to other missions at the Lab). This transition to the 
final phase came with a decline in resources and personnel, 
as NASA expects such a “well-oiled” machine to require 
less funding to do what it already does well. 
The start of the final phase also meant that the engineers 
were beginning to plan for the end. Multiple proposals for 
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the final phase of the mission were put forth, depending on 
the funding received, but all included a “spiral of death” in 
the final year of the mission, when the spacecraft would fly 
in tighter and tighter orbits, eking out its last drops of its 
finite “consumables” such as fuel, to reach a spectacular 
finish, flying between the planet and its rings before 
plummeting into the planet to burn up in its atmosphere. 
This death spiral allows the team to continue science up 
until its last moments until either fuel runs out or 
communication is lost, imparting little boosts to maintain 
the spacecraft’s orbit as long as possible. The final 
“naturally decaying” orbit also ensures the proper 
“disposal” of the spacecraft - if communication is lost, the 
spacecraft will not escape the gravitational pull of Saturn, 
but will “go ballistic” and plummet to its death.  
During this time, the spacecraft also began to show various 
signs of decay. One of its “reaction wheels” was showing 
signs of drag; one of its instruments was occasionally 
shorting out. And on the software side, there were 
programming languages reaching end of support, or 
becoming too costly or risky to maintain.  
The transition into the final phase thus came with an 
increased recognition of the aging of the mission 
infrastructure and an emergent appreciation for decline, 
loss, and finitude of infrastructural lifetimes. I have adopted 
the term “geriatric” to refer to this phase in the life of the 
infrastructure because it encapsulates both this recognition 
of aging and decline, and the ethic of care that became 
increasingly dominant during my fieldwork. Engineers 
increasingly worked to manage and negotiate the effects of 
aging and decay or what engineers called “lifetime issues” - 
bugs or anomalies that arise simply because over such a 
long life the unlikely becomes likely or the idiosyncrasies 
of long-term use crop up unexpected frictions. Indeed, 
engineers spoke of the spacecraft quite often in terms you 
might use for an elderly loved one, and at times felt a 
sympathetic connection to its aging. 
The recognition of the infrastructure’s agedness did not 
come all at once, but through a series of such moments of 
decay, which brought about a sense that the “machine is not 
what it once was” and so demands greater care. Yet at the 
same time, the transition was quite marked. Before the start 
of the final phase of the mission there had been a hopeful 
account of how the excitement of flying “closer than ever 
before” to the planet might lead renewal and rejuvenation - 
receiving a ramp up in funding, attracting a fresh crop of 
young engineers, and even adopting newer more agile 
development processes to match the iterations of their 
science planning to the faster rhythm of its orbits. After the 
start of the final phase of the mission, however, this 
excitement had faded and was replaced gradually by a sense 
of the need to slow down in the final phase in order to make 
it successfully to the end in 2017. The funding for a ramp 
up did not look likely, and besides, the engineers pointed 
out, the spacecraft was just not built for agility. 
A geriatric infrastructure is thus one that is not merely old 
but is in the process of becoming old, with an emergent 
recognition of aging as a process and an increased 
appreciation for decline, loss, and finitude of lifetimes of 
the different parts of the overall system as well as the ways 
in which these multiple lifetimes are entangled. Decay and 
aging are a form of infrastructural change that can disrupt 
practice, but as I found, how such changes are managed and 
negotiated also involves a shift towards what I call 
convivial decay. This is a recognition of the negotiated 
nature of decay and the need to work actively with decline 
rather than against it, by attending to the mutual livability 
of its constituent parts and attendant practices of care. 
The following sections offer vignettes from observations in 
the field that reveal the emergent recognition of agedness 
and acceptance of loss and decay. They also illustrate the 
negotiated nature of decay. While not exhaustive of the 
types of decay I observed in the field, they aim to provide 
representative illustrations of the work that engineers 
perform to bring their own work into alignment with a 
decaying infrastructure.  These vignettes illustrate how 
engineers working to maintain and sustain this 
infrastructure came into an appreciation of its decline, 
coming to know/perform the agedness of the infrastructure, 
and actively work towards its end. I selected these 
particular vignettes with an aim to show the work of 
managing the aging and decay of both hardware and 
software, each of which had its own (in)visibilities within 
the mission organization.  
From Kills to Quiet Time 
During December 2010 while I was out of the field for the 
holidays, the Mission experienced an “anomalous event”. 
The spacecraft received an incoming file and responded by 
going into “safing”. The spacecraft could not interpret the 
file it received and so, instead of conducting science, it 
pointed towards earth, sent out a distress signal, and 
awaited further instruction. This of course led to some 
amount of concern on the ground.  
The safing had come after sending a non-routine file to the 
craft that included a software update to the spacecraft’s 
“flight software” – something that has only been done with 
great caution a few times over the life of the mission. This 
type of error would be difficult to repair since it could 
impact the ability of the engineers to communicate 
effectively with the craft to troubleshoot and locate the 
cause of error. 
Fortunately it turned out that the error in the file was the 
result of a “bit flip” caused by the rare occurrence when the 
radio waves transmitting a file to the spacecraft are 
bombarded by a cosmic ray, turning a zero into a one and 
making the file unreadable to the spacecraft. This was 
fortunate because it meant that no human error had caused 
the safing, and that the problem could be repaired by simply 
resending the file. Of course, this still resulted in the loss of 
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science, not only the sequence of science that should have 
been received alongside the software update, but also the 
time lost as the engineering team worked to analyze and 
resolve what had occurred.  
Gwen, the lead engineer for the spacecraft office told me 
afterwards that the anomaly had been a kind of wake up 
call, a moment of recognizing the limitations of the 
spacecraft as well as her own. Gwen had a kind of 
sympathetic relation to the craft. Around the time that the 
spacecraft wheels had started to deteriorate she had some 
health issues resulting in surgery on her leg, affecting her 
mobility. With the safing, she had experienced the threat of 
an error introduced into the spacecraft hardware as a 
moment of realizing that her memory might not be what it 
once was and that she might need to rely more on the next 
generation of engineers rather than her own “gut instincts.”  
The safing was felt by Gwen as a reminder of her own 
aging and the aging of the craft together, a wake up call to 
put some procedures into writing for the sake of the final 
years of the mission. She recognized in this moment, a need 
to write down more, to capture her expertise in order to 
transition some leadership to a younger engineer protégé. 
But it was also framed, in retrospect, as a kind of gift of 
time — more time to figure out what is going on with the 
spacecraft. I stopped by to talk to one of Gwen’s engineers, 
Jared, who told me about the event. He seemed actively 
excited about the safing and how it had opened up a chance 
for “spacecraft activity” and “to learn new things” including 
testing out which of the reaction wheels on the craft was in 
worse shape. 
This kind of time dedicated purely to engineering purposes 
is very rare. It coincided with some tension that had 
emerged around the degradation of the reaction wheels. The 
additional stress on the engineering team to implement 
science that did not cause harm to the wheels had lead to 
the loss of science. As I will discuss in a later section, this 
had caused a frustration among the science teams that 
science was being “deleted” or “killed” by the software 
used to protect the wheels or by the engineering team 
themselves.  
Gwen explained this attitude of science being seen as 
“killed” as arising from an attitude that does not attend to 
the craft as a limited resource. “The science planning folks 
only think about how much science to fit in, doing more 
science.” Sometimes there are segments of the spacecraft’s 
orbit which are of less interest to scientists and Gwen’s 
team will have a “quiet segment” when the spacecraft is 
essentially just flying, relying on its own automated 
software. Gwen sees value in quiescence, “but,” she says, 
“the scientists don’t understand that, they don’t understand 
the idea of less science.” 
Now the safing event had caused a lot less science. When I 
stopped by the Science Planning area to catch up with 
Cassie, she also brought up the safing and I expected her to 
be frustrated, but she seemed to concur with what I heard 
from those on the spacecraft engineering team. She said: 
“The safing was interesting because they learned about 
some communication mechanisms they can have in place to 
make things go better now that the organization is 
somewhat different. Gwen pushed really hard to have a 
longer time after the safing to recover, [in order] to 
manage people’s expectations that they will not be always 
recovering from safing as quickly as they used to. Not that 
safing happens that often, like it does on [some other 
mission] where they happen all the time, but we’ve had a 
record of very quick recovery from safing and as we go into 
[the final mission phase] we may not recover as quickly.”  
This was a marked shift in the way that loss of science data 
had been spoken about before the safing and the transition 
into the final mission phase. The anomaly created a moment 
of pause, which was seen as a gift to the spacecraft 
engineering team to reassess their processes, but it also 
became a resource in managing expectations from the 
science team, and shifting them from an attitude of kills to 
one in which quiescence, pause, and slower responses may 
be necessary to give time to react. In turn Cassie was using 
this shift to help condition the scientists under her 
management to the idea that loss of science was not an 
opening for renegotiation of which science discipline would 
win in battles over future orbital segments. 
This process of negotiation became a kind of tide change. 
Not a win for engineering per se, but a shift towards 
appreciation of loss as a necessity in this final phase of the 
mission and a refiguring of the relationship between loss 
and benefit. The anomaly was a moment of “pause” not 
only for Gwen but for the entire organization to reorient a 
kind of “infrastructural inversion”[4] when the needs of the 
spacecraft as an aging system became clear. 
Making them say “Ow” 
In the case of the spacecraft, a change such as hardware 
deterioration or software malfunction is powerfully visible 
within the organization. In the transition into the final phase 
of the mission there were other similar events such as an 
on-board instrument “shorting out”. In each of these events, 
a very conservative response was taken that prioritized 
safety of the craft over the needs of science. This was often 
achieved by positioning the spacecraft as aged and in need 
of care.  
However, when it comes to the mission ground system 
infrastructure, it proved much harder to assess, know, or 
make visible the agedness of the various software tools. If 
software decays it does so in ways that are largely invisible 
to the organization. One of the most glaring reminders of 
this was the fact that I heard many conflicting stories about 
what the transition to the final mission phase would mean 
for software systems at the mission.  
Both before and after the start of the final phase I heard that 
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this phase would mean less science, due to cuts in staff and 
resources. However, there were much less consistent 
remarks about whether the transition would mean more or 
less software. I heard both stories from people all over the 
organization.  Some said that the final phase would mean 
fewer personnel, a more fragile craft, and increased reliance 
on software to pick up the pieces and automate the work 
done by people leaving the mission.  Others said that there 
would be less software in the final years, since as you lose 
people, you lose knowledge about how software works, and 
when a piece of software breaks and the person who wrote 
it is no longer around, you will have to go back to doing it 
manually.  
Rather than a marked transition into acceptance of data loss 
and quiet time for the spacecraft, Sarah, the lead engineer in 
charge of the ground system had a difficult time relaying to 
management an appreciation of how software systems 
obsolesce and age. 
“They don’t really have much experience of what happens 
after launch… Once the system is perceived as mature, 
which in many people’s minds is at launch, the perception 
is that it shouldn’t need much attention. Which we know is 
not true, but [it] remains a widely held belief.”   
In an effort to demonstrate and communicate the needs for 
software maintenance, Sarah had been cataloging the extent 
of undocumented software on the mission and asking the 
various engineering and science planning teams to do 
similar “house-keeping” to generate lists of their most 
important scripts and utilities.2  
We sat and talked in her office about the state of the ground 
system and the role of software in the mission operations, 
while she worked on preparing an inventory of all the 
“Category D” software used on the mission. Category D is 
not even a real category, but a catchall term for all the 
software tools that usually go undocumented.3 While 
Category D is, by definition, meant to be software that 
engineers can “live without,” in reality these are scripts and 
small programs that have accrued in the hundreds over the 
many years of the mission. 
“Have you ever heard the term glueware?” Sarah asked me, 
                                                            
2 Software scripts are snippets of code that can be used to 
automate a small part of a workflow, e.g. watching a repository for 
particular incoming file updates and sending an email. Utilities 
were the colloquial name for small software programs that are 
perceived only to affect quality or ease of work, such as a tool that 
color codes spacecraft data to ease routine monitoring of 
subsystem status. 
3 Ordinarily the organization only keeps an inventory of the 
software tools that are considered “mission critical” according to 
standards provided by NASA so that changes to these systems 
receive proper oversight. Category A software, e.g., are those tools 
where an erroneous change to the code could result in mission 
failure ⁠. 
“Well you start with this system design from 15 years ago, 
and as you go along you have to tweak it, but it’s too hard 
to go into the compiled stuff, so you start adding on the 
inside and the outside.” While Category D is not officially 
delivered software, in the many years of the mission these 
scripts have proliferated and become part of the fabric and 
“glue” that keeps the infrastructure going.  
I brought up with Sarah this inconsistency about whether 
there would be more or less software in the final mission 
phase. “Which is it?” I asked. She responded with 
exasperation, as paraphrased in my field notes quoted here: 
At this Sarah sighed and went somewhat silent and reticent 
and was clearly expressing a LOT with that silence. There 
was some emotion in it, perhaps some sense of awe for the 
problem itself and giving of silence for the people whose 
lives are impacted by this problem. It may also have been 
anger, letting some anger come up and settle down before 
speaking and composing a way to speak honestly and 
directly but also diplomatically. She said, well, she has 
been in that argument for a while now and it seems like the 
decision is that we are going to have more software than we 
can afford to maintain.   
She went on to explain further that when they originally 
planned out the resources for the ground system… in terms 
of IT people, programmers, etc. to complete the work and 
maintain the software, [for the final phase of the mission] it 
was based on assumptions that have turned out to be 
false… but that the decision is just to proceed according to 
plan anyways.  
She was especially silent at this point saying, well, what is 
going to happen I think is... that things will have to slow 
down. She said this slowly. Slow. Down.  When something 
breaks, when you have a change request, it will take much 
longer than it does now and longer than you want it to.   
Like Gwen, Sarah was working to prepare both her group 
and the Mission as a whole to the idea of loss, particularly 
in the few months remaining before she retired and there 
would no longer be anyone in her position. The transition to 
the final mission phase entailed a lot of software changes at 
once as efforts to reduce costs by migrating from versions 
of software that the Lab’s centralized software team no 
longer supported or to reduce overhead costs associated 
with maintaining software.  
One such change involved migrating from an old file 
sharing system to another. In preparation for a meeting 
where the various teams would report back to her on their 
“homework” of cataloging their own scripts and Category 
D software, she also moved a single file test from the old to 
the new file sharing system. At the meeting Sarah presented 
the results of her survey of Category D software. She then 
asked for a raise of hands from everyone whose workflow 
was affected by the one moved file. When everyone’s hands 
went up there was a gasp in the room followed by uneasy 
laughter. There was an uncanny feeling that arose in the 
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realization that the software that each team uses is not really 
all that distinct but is bound together, often through 
“glueware” that links them all together. “I can’t believe it 
touched all of us” one engineer said. Sarah called this 
technique, making them “say ow” – giving them a single 
pinch so that she could save them from more dramatic pains 
later on. Without the aide of phenomenal events like an 
anomaly or degrading wheel, Sarah had to manufacture 
something to trigger recognition of the ground system’s 
“maturity”.  
Degrading Science vs. Degrading Hardware 
As mentioned earlier, the safing event on the spacecraft had 
given the engineers time to test out one of the reaction 
wheels that had started to shown signs of decay.4  These 
wheels help to orient the spacecraft in space as it orbits 
Saturn. The movements of the spacecraft must be finely 
“choreographed” since the fields of view of its scientific 
instruments are quite small and the spacecraft itself is 
hurdling by these targets at many kilometers per second. 
Science planners use a piece of software called the Pointing 
Design Tool (PDT) which spits out a command file for 
pointing the spacecraft in space, but are largely unaware of 
how these designs might affect the spacecraft as a whole. 
The engineers in charge of the articulation control system 
are continuously monitoring the wheels, comparing 
incoming telemetry data to their expected behavior. These 
engineers must carefully examine and tweak these 
command files to protect the safety of the craft – making 
sure that e.g. instruments do not overheat from pointing 
towards the sun, or that the spacecraft is not sent conflicting 
commands to be in two places at once. They can sometimes 
protect the intent of the pointing by maintaining the 
orientation of the spacecraft along one axis while offsetting 
it along another. They can also manage the wheel spin rates 
(keeping them from reaching upper bounds) by inserting 
“biases” where excess wheel speed is dissipated by using 
thrusters (and precious fuel) to stabilize the craft. 
These engineers place biases by using a piece of software 
called the Reaction Wheel Bias Optimizer Tool (RWBOT). 
This software models the spin rates needed to achieve the 
required pointing and optimizes for fuel use, suggesting 
some solutions for where to place biases into the sequence. 
The engineers try to place these between scientific 
observations but occasionally have to cut some science to 
make sure the wheels are safely commanded.  
But now these engineers noticed that the wheels were 
experiencing some unexpected drag suggesting that 
                                                            
4 The spacecraft has three “reaction wheels” which are spun in 
order to rotate the spacecraft in space along three (x, y, and z) 
axes. Because the spacecraft is floating in the vacuum of space, it 
is a change in the rate of spin of the wheels that results in a 
rotation of the spacecraft. 
something was wrong.5 To research the cause of this drag, 
the Mission organization called in wheel rotation dynamic 
specialists, and consulted the wheel manufacturers. The 
wheels were specified by their manufacturer to have a 
guaranteed number of turns in their lifetime as long as they 
were kept within upper bounds. However, the Mission 
organization soon discovered that the wheels likely cause of 
decay arose due to dwelling in very low speeds close to 
zero and shifting subtly back and forth around zero. They 
theorized that this might cause the lubricant around the 
wheels’ ball bearings to clump such that the wheels might 
eventually seize up. 
This research was then integrated into RWBOT, which was 
given new parameters to avoid lower bounds and to balance 
fuel use with demands on the wheels, which were now also 
considered a “consumable” like fuel. The results of this 
change were dramatic. The engineers in the spacecraft 
office were no longer able to easily arrive at solutions that 
would protect the wheels. The software itself was taking 
much longer runtime to arrive at proposed solutions. 
Engineers would set it to run overnight while they were off 
work and return in the morning to analyze the results but 
there was just insufficient time in the schedule to run and 
re-run the software if the proposed solutions negatively 
impacted science. Meetings where the spacecraft engineers 
presented RWBOT’s solutions to the science team became 
heated and tense. Spacecraft engineers were accused of 
“killing science” and science planners questioned the 
prioritizing of the wheels asking whether their degradation 
should be staved off by “degrading science”.   
This was not the first time that RWBOT had been a source 
of tension between the two teams and old debates were 
trudged up about the ways that RWBOT mediated 
communication between the two teams or how the 
spacecraft engineers handled the translation of science 
pointing to protect the wheels6. In the past, the tensions had 
been resolved through the creation of new rules. If very 
long observations tracking a slowly moving object like a 
moon had been bad for the wheels, a new rule was 
instituted that restricted the length of observations.  
But with the decay and its resulting change to the RWBOT 
software, the engineers struggled to derive any predictable 
problems from their experience using software in its new 
                                                            
5 There are legitimate reasons why the wheels might experience 
drag, such as when flying close enough to a moon to experience 
drag from its atmosphere.  The spacecraft is given “torque 
authority” to autonomously override incoming commands in order 
to achieve the commanded wheel spin rate and overcome such 
drag. But when the drag on wheel 3 was spiking unusually high, 
the spacecraft office realized that they needed to re-assess the 
health of the wheels. 
6 For more discussion of how software tools mediate collaborative 
work in this case, please see [18]. 
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version. For one thing, they had not had time to develop a 
sensibility for the kinds of solutions that RWBOT was now 
choosing. Eventually they created some “guidelines” being 
careful not to create rules that might suggest that the 
behavior of RWBOT was somehow predictable. They titled 
these guidelines as how to be “RWBOT-friendly.” 
Eventually an RWBOT meeting went smoothly with no 
deleted science. There was no clear singular cause for this 
adjustment but engineers spoke to me about their theories. 
One was that the difficulties with RWBOT coincided with a 
change in the inclination of their orbit, which changed the 
geometries of scientific observations and put more strain on 
the system. Another was that there was a shift towards a 
more “friendly” attitude among the scientists towards the 
new guidelines. In the past, rules instituted for protecting 
the safety of the craft had defined keep-out zones which had 
been hard coded into the PDT software such that scientists 
tended to work around them, doing their best to “game the 
system” (e.g. if an observation must be shorter than a 
particular duration, creating a long observation by dividing 
it up into sequential shorter ones).  
While this worked for most kinds of rules developed by 
engineers so far (e.g. in the form of keep-out zones where 
instruments cannot point), the guidelines to protect the 
wheels were there mostly to help the engineers make their 
work rhythms sustainable. The new RWBOT-friendly 
guidelines were written to enforce a more holistic 
perspective, which required scientists to view RWBOT less 
as an unpredictable “troll under the bridge” that kills 
science, and more as one tool used by their engineering 
colleagues. 
As a moment of celebration at the end of the first smooth 
RWBOT process, Gwen wheeled in a giant birthday cake to 
deliver as a gift to the science planning team, as a form of 
recompense for lost science. She jokingly explained the gift 
saying “now you can’t say we never give you anything” 
responding to the sense that engineering only takes away 
science rather than supporting it. The cake decoration 
spelled out “5000th day since launch”, marking a birthday of 
sorts of the spacecraft. This highlighted the age of the 
spacecraft, but also made visible the everyday temporal 
rhythms of engineers in the spacecraft office where “days 
since launch” are counted. While the science planning team 
was on their 50th science sequence, the spacecraft team who 
works on a daily basis to command and operate the craft 
count out time differently.  
Letting Software Break 
While these changes to expectations of the spacecraft 
hardware arise due to material decay, there is no real 
catalyst for making people see the pain that might come 
from relying upon unmaintainable software. Due to the 
decrease in staffing, the software team was by far the most 
reduced in size, and in fact had already been cut 
significantly before the middle phase of the mission. Sarah 
was concerned in light of her retirement that it would be an 
issue related to software rather than hardware that might 
bring the mission abruptly to a premature end. 
In preparation for the final phase, the team was letting go of 
permission structures that provide a layer of protection from 
errant changes to the software. The software team was 
removing its separation of designated operations and 
development servers – switching to a reliance on the 
developers themselves to keep their development work 
from interfering with software in active use. They also were 
making reductions to their “configuration management” 
such that everyone would have access to all servers and 
would have to rely upon trust and communication to not 
disrupt each other’s work.  
Learning to live without these divides and partitions was a 
difficult transition. Downgrading and letting go of software 
systems feels counter-intuitive since software that works 
and runs well becomes invisible. At a meeting that Sarah 
held to go over these changes, she went through the new set 
up, going through an excel list of machines and who was 
responsible for each. At first the meeting proceeded in a 
typical fashion, with Sarah and other managers overseeing 
the decision-making of how these servers would be 
configured. Suddenly, the discussion shifted as individuals 
committing to particular set ups realized that this was going 
to be the last managerial discussion of its kind. They began 
to recognize that this configuration was a different sort of 
task than they had done before. With the new system, 
people might be able to get into a server space that they 
could not before. This would not result in changes in 
permission structure but would have to be handled in an ad 
hoc manner.  
Sarah actively shifted the conversation, moving from 
possible scenarios posed in terms of “suppose that 
something breaks” to an assumption that breakages will 
happen, by asking “how would it break?” When her 
colleagues scrambled to figure out a way to set up the 
permissions so that they would not break, Sarah reiterated 
that “it should break” and repeated this throughout the 
conversation until others began to concur, saying we should 
“go ahead and set it up knowing it is going to break.”   
The discussion started to shift and people began to joke 
about how they should “speak now or forever hold their 
peace.” When it was decided that it would simply be the 
user’s responsibility to know the purpose of each machine 
and to not make changes without talking to the person 
responsible for the server (literally with the server at their 
knees), one developer in the room captured the unsettled 
feeling in the room calling out “It’s the wild west!” and 
someone else chimed in “Enter at your own risk” to which 
everyone starts laughing, breaking the tension. 
This new Wild West mode in which you enter at your own 
risk is one where they give up tight bureaucratic control in 
favor of “a common machine”, trusting in the collective 
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behavior of the group to work itself out and trusting breaks 
to guide misdirected attempts to the proper machine. It 
denoted a shift towards a mode of thinking about breaks as 
productive. Software should break, and stay broken, as a 
way to ease users off of unmaintainable systems or 
protocols.  This reframing is similar to the role played by 
the spacecraft anomaly, in which people are conditioned to 
accept loss, adjusting to more and more breaks in systems 
associated with the reduced resources of the final phase and 
coping with these changes.  
But more than merely acclimating to loss as a new state of 
affairs, this effort required an active working towards loss, 
working to let go of system-entanglements, working 
towards breakages as a productive process of letting go.  In 
letting go of particular partitions, separations both material 
and metaphorical, the relationship between letting go and 
moving forward is exposed. Breaking things is needed in 
order to extend the possibility of keeping them going.  In a 
way breakage is for software what quiescence is for 
hardware — a respite. 
DISCUSSION 
The case of a geriatric infrastructure offers a novel 
empirical example of infrastructure repair where there is a 
known end-of-life towards which engineers are working. In 
such work, there is ongoing work to extend the life of the 
infrastructure to ensure it reaches 2017, and of course the 
work of engineers is filled with novelty and inventiveness 
even at this late stage in the infrastructure’s life. In this case 
we can see familiar forms of work including repair-as-
sustaining and repair-as-transformation [25] as well as 
repair-as-appropriation [16] or repair-as-sustaining [11]. 
However, the case also identifies a related empirical form 
of work that is repair-into-decay. Repair work can at times 
work not to renew but to let go. Rather than fending off 
death [8], repair can embrace endings, finitude, and loss, 
working with and into decline rather than against it. The 
case contributes empirical understanding of the careful and 
cautious work that is involved in disconnection and 
disassembly [8]. It also reveals the collaborative work 
through which such decline is performed, managed, and 
negotiated.  
In the vignettes shared above, we see that repair-into-decay 
involves an increased appreciation for loss, decline, pause, 
and finitude. This appreciation appears to emerge on the 
one hand in response to ruptures in the form of anomalous 
events that trigger new understandings of the infrastructure 
as aged and in decline and requiring of adjusted 
expectations. Yet on the other hand, we can see how the 
relative agedness of various parts of the infrastructure is 
actively performed as part of the negotiation of what and 
how this decline should unfold.  
In the following sections I discuss how we might make 
sense of this seeming contradiction. Agedness is both 
recognized and performed and even the ruptures which 
trigger an awareness of agedness reveal a doubleness in 
which infrastructure is old and new at once. Repair-into-
decay invokes a negotiation of what counts as old, what 
should survive, what should persist, and what should be let 
go. This negotiation is one that attends to the mutual 
livability of work practices in a form of alignment work I 
call convivial decay. 
Recognizing and Performing Agedness 
In the vignettes I have shared, we can see an ongoing 
negotiation of what will degrade and how as the space 
science infrastructure is increasingly recognized as aging 
and in need of care. In some cases particular changes due to 
decay, such as the wheel degradation, are events that 
disrupt current practice and surface tensions across the 
work practices of different teams, which need to be brought 
back into a sustainable alignment. While disruptions to 
current practice are not necessarily new to this stage of the 
mission, what is notable is that these events trigger, or are 
taken up as resources for an emergent recognition of the 
“stage of life” or “maturity” of the infrastructure and 
appreciation for loss, decline, and finitude.  
There is a marked shift from a culture in which science and 
engineering are at odds with each other, with a language of 
killing and deleting of science in favor of hardware, to one 
in which loss, pause, and quiescence are perceived as 
beneficial and necessary. In some cases moments of 
changes in the performance of the spacecraft hardware 
make the aging and decay of the infrastructure imminently 
apparent.  In other cases, it takes the active insertion of a 
disruption such as the movement of a file or the removal of 
a permissions structure, to trigger this recognition that the 
maintenance of the infrastructure requires some adjustment.  
The recognition of the agedness of the infrastructure is not a 
process that isolates aging to a particular device. 
Infrastructural decay is a process that emerges through the 
ways that different parts of the system, aging at different 
rates are entangled with each other. What decays or ages 
are the relations across multiple parts of the infrastructure 
and among people, the organization, and its technologies.  
For example, we saw how the sympathies between Gwen’s 
own aging and the aging of the craft became a resource for 
her to ensure the ongoing life of the infrastructure by 
facilitating intergenerational hand-off and not assuming a 
fast and agile recovery from such anomalous events.  As 
another example, we can see how the degradation of the 
wheel cannot be isolated to hardware or software or 
practice alone. The wheel degradation is in fact unknowable 
without the mediation of software used to analyze its 
behavior. It is not the degradation of the wheel itself that 
initiates the re-negotiation of work between engineering 
and science planning teams. Rather, the RWBOT software 
reveals how the management of wheel degradation and the 
interface between the two teams are simultaneously and co-
constitutively negotiated.  
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Engineers who have worked for much of their careers on 
this particular infrastructure have developed sympathy akin 
to what Vertesi observed with the Mars Rover engineers in 
[32]. In this case, it is a sympathy with the aging of the 
system, experienced as an alignment of coming to know 
one’s own aging, as well as the aging of the organization, 
through the aging of the infrastructure. The desire to 
rejuvenate what is perceived to be a “dinosaur” 
infrastructure past its prime through the adoption of 
organizational methods that are more contemporary with 
other missions, exemplifies how agedness is not simply 
known through physical decay but also through the ecology 
of different systems aging in relation to each other.  
In this way aging is clearly a sociotechnical process where 
aging cannot be isolated to hardware or software, material 
decay or changes in practice. Furthermore, agedness not 
only arises across collectivities of people and machines, but 
is also performed through negotiations of what counts as 
old or the relative agedness of different parts of the system. 
In one moment what is figured as old in order to demand 
care, is figured as new in order to demand prestige.  
Lifetime Issues 
The recognition of agedness that emerged during my 
fieldwork was often catalyzed by events that disrupted 
practice as usual. As one engineer put it, this is the stage of 
life of an infrastructure where “lifetime issues” start to crop 
up. This can be in the form of a bug that emerges in 
software that has been used and maintained for decades, 
simply because of the idiosyncrasies of a particular orbit or 
of a new inexperienced engineer arriving to the mission and 
being “thrown into the deep-end of Unix” which is no 
longer taught in schools. 
An event such as an anomaly on the spacecraft, a bug in 
code, provokes reflection on changes in the infrastructure 
that have arisen due to aging and decay.  Lifetime issues are 
a type of sociotechnical change that occurs simultaneously 
as a rupture and a drift. They arise in a particular event but 
in the form of a post hoc reflection on something that is 
already latent in the system. Lifetime issues hold a 
doubleness of potentiality and things running their course.  
This is seen quite evocatively in the case of the wheels, 
which clearly have been decaying gradually from the 
moment they entered space. The degrading wheels here are 
indeed a form of slippage [26] between understandings of 
the wheel’s performance from manufacturing specifications 
and their actual performance, but the slippage itself is not 
something which can be located at a particular moment in 
time. The lifetime of a wheel is specified by manufacturers 
through simulations during testing – e.g. spinning the wheel 
fast until it over heats, spinning it for a long time until it 
shows break down. But the actual lifetime of a wheel-in-use 
imparts a different notion of that duration.  
Even the anomaly, which is clearly experienced by the 
organization as a rupture, is, in retrospect, also understood 
through the lens of duration or lifetimes. The anomaly 
created a moment of pause in which the agedness and decay 
of the infrastructure were negotiated in terms of 
infrastructural, biographical, and institutional rhythms [14] 
including inter-generational hand-off. But the anomaly was 
also narrated to me as a “lifetime issue” in the sense that 
cosmic rays are of such a rare occurrence in the vacuum of 
space that the chance of bombardment of the Mission’s 
radio wave communication to the spacecraft goes up the 
longer it is in space. “In fact,” Gwen exclaimed, the 
infrastructure, as a whole, had become “a quite fine-tuned 
instrument for detecting the prevalence of cosmic rays in 
the galaxy.” 
These changes can be seen as a form of infrastructural 
torque [4,33]. Bowker and Star describe torque as a 
“twisting of time lines that pull at each other” as 
“trajectories” of institutions, categories, biographies, etc. 
“pull or torque each other over time [as] they move in 
different directions or different rates” [3]. As they point out, 
this twisting arises over the duration of lives. While there is 
perhaps a singular moment in which the engineering team 
at the Mission realized that the wheels might be decaying, 
this decay arises though only gradually. The twisting is also 
“multiple” in a similar way as referred to by [30] because 
infrastructures are comprised of multiple temporalities and 
trajectories of careers, hardware and software systems, 
managerial methodologies, etc. 
“Lifetime issues” are precisely those issues that are 
happening in the background but only surface over the 
lifetime of a system. There is a coincidence within the case 
described here between the perception of increased 
occurrence of such lifetime issues, and the recognition of 
the need to slow down and learn how to appreciate 
agedness, loss, and decay so that these can be responded to 
appropriately. It is not clear which comes first – the need to 
slow down precipitating a recognition of lifetime issues or 
vice versa. I strongly suspect that there is no particular time 
in the life of the Mission or of any infrastructure project 
where there are significantly more or less ruptures that 
break the flow of routine work. Yet, these particular 
ruptures in the form of “lifetime issues” allow us to see how 
the performance of agedness participates in the process of 
negotiating how the organization responds to decay. 
Declaring the infrastructure an instrument for detecting 
cosmic rays, for example, places it on the frontier of 
engineering and scientific knowledge, even in a moment of 
decay and breakdown. This performance of presenting what 
is old as new arose many times throughout my fieldwork. In 
a poignant moment, sitting with Gwen in her office, she 
related how the scientists want them to take science that 
was designed years ago “off the shelf and dust it off and 
then fly it on a new machine”. In this, Gwen positions the 
aging spacecraft as new, and the science that exists in a 
design document, as old, inverting the traditional 
maintenance-design relationship. As the vignettes shared 
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above reveal, Gwen is successful in her efforts to gain more 
resources and time for her engineers who maintain the 
spacecraft in part because she is able to claim that the 
machine is new, it is not what it once was. 
Convivial Decay as Alignment Work 
The negotiation of decay is a form of alignment work to 
deal with the slippages [26] that arise between what a 
system once was and what it has become. However, what 
this case reveals is that decay occasions different forms of 
alignment work than have been previously discussed in the 
CSCW literature [e.g.2,14,28].  
In the vignettes above, we can see forms of negotiation 
which are familiar to CSCW research, working through 
negotiations across scales [23], rhythms [14,22,28], and 
through the use of boundary-negotiating objects [16] such 
as the RWBOT software itself. Yet the negotiation also 
takes place through positioning the relative agedness of 
various parts of the infrastructure.  
Tensions indeed arise across scales and rhythms - indicative 
of the different lifeworlds that are brought into conflict. For 
example, in the fraught RWBOT debates over what should 
degrade, it is the ways that RWBOT represents temporal 
scales and rhythms of work that has historically led to so 
much miscommunication between teams who have different 
ways of working. However, in the resolution of the present 
RWBOT issues, these differences were not the most salient 
tensions that needed to be resolved so much as the mutual 
livability of these lifeworlds side by side.7 The different 
temporalities did not need to be brought into sync with one 
another but rather simply needed to be ground into a 
companionable relationship.  
This may help to elucidate why a satisfactory explanation 
for the resolution of the RWBOT case remained elusive or 
why a cake can matter as a form of sociotechnical repair. 
They reveal that what is negotiated in the face of decay is a 
mutual livability of systems and practices that are running 
out different lifetimes, aging at different rates, and yet 
mutually entangled and interdependent.  
Decay has a temporal quality that disrupts the assumed 
progressive temporality of technological change. It asks: 
were prior alignments as livable as we thought? Livability 
thus deals in rhythms but also in durations. It requires a 
consideration of which rhythms of work are sustainable or 
livable, and an awareness that the lifetimes of systems are 
themselves finite. The negotiation of decay is a negotiation 
of multiple lifetimes that are entwined – how to carefully 
cut these away from each other, or allow them to be 
companionable. It is this process of alignment that I call 
convivial decay.  
Convivial decay is a form of alignment work that deals with 
                                                            
7 This notion of livable worlds is drawn from [9]. 
the lifetimes and mutual livability of the relationships that 
inhabit infrastructure.  It is a working with rather than 
against loss and finitude and an active letting go to enable 
livable sociotechnical worlds that are companionable with 
each other. It is an active pursuit to let go with care and 
maintain livability of different forms of work and different 
parts of the system. 
Convivial decay is not something that just happens 
whenever a system ages. Clearly it takes work. In some 
ways the evocative decay and breakdown of hardware (the 
wheel’s drag, the safing event) make it easier for the aging 
of hardware to demand attention. Software’s aging is, 
however, less obviously visible and more counter-intuitive 
to management. The idea that a bug can surface through the 
idiosyncrasies of practice after decades of use is taken as 
quite shocking. It shows the same doubleness of how the 
software can be both old and new at the same time just as a 
decaying wheel can tell us something new about long-
standing practices. Software developers seem to know this. 
It is inherent in the idea that the entire mission is a run time 
test of the software. Each iteration of science is unique and 
so each iteration holds the potential to break some long-
held assumption embedded in the software. Discrepancies 
between the manufacturing specifications of the wheel and 
its actual operations are in many ways equivalent to the 
discrepancies between the design specifications of software 
and the practices of its use. Yet these software 
discrepancies are harder to know in a culture that treats 
software’s histories as irrelevant or its life as stagnant after 
launch. 
While the vignettes related to hardware above are in some 
ways more evocative, it is the relationship between 
software and conviviality that I wish to pursue in future 
work. Software is central to convivial decay in that it both 
contains its own processes of aging and mediates 
breakdowns of hardware and how these are made 
accountable and available to repair [29]. In the end the 
conflict over the spacecraft’s wheel decay became a conflict 
over the way that a software tool, RWBOT, played a 
decisive role in what science lived or died. Software too has 
its forms of living and dying and its ways of mediating 
what forms of work are made sustainable and livable and 
which others are not.  
In a way, it is software where conviviality gets complicated. 
This requires a lot more research - to understand how 
software ages, and how its multiple entangled lifetimes and 
their aging can be negotiated with conviviality. Particularly, 
when we consider that no infrastructural systems emerge 
whole-cloth without reliance on older legacy code, we can 
see how conviviality might be worth understanding, even in 
early stages of the life of systems, to help bring the caution 
and care that attending to the mutually entangled lifetimes 
of all systems warrant. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, what this case of a geriatric infrastructures 
shows is that infrastructural decay is known and negotiated 
through an emerging appreciation for the multiple and 
entangled lifetimes of infrastructure. Infrastructural decay is 
thus not a passive backdrop, or a “natural” process of time’s 
passing. The temporality of decay is not a singular 
trajectory that unfolds along an evolutionary timeline, but 
rather is heterotemporal and relational. This is in part due to 
the relativistic time of lifetimes and aging as noted by 
Traweek in [31]. We only know what is old by virtue of 
what is young. While it may only be a problem for 
coordination that one part of a technology moves at a faster 
rate than another, this difference will produce a kind of 
torque over time, one each of these parts ages. It is only 
once a particular rhythm or piece of technology is lived 
with for a long time that we can recognize what has become 
old. We live in the aftermath of decisions about standards, 
rules, etc. that then apply torque as they age.  
This implies that in order to understand the lifetimes of 
infrastructure it may not be enough to study them 
longitudinally. Such an approach implies a singular 
temporality of the biography of an infrastructure as it is 
born, lives, and dies. But what this case reveals is the 
heterotemporality of infrastructural lifetimes, something 
which becomes very apparent in the cropping up of lifetime 
issues and decay, but which is no less present in moments 
of design “upstream”. Change which can only be 
understood and appreciated through the lens of duration, are 
not the exclusive purview of old and aging infrastructure – 
though this seems to invoke particular insights for those 
working with them that can be ignored in earlier phases. 
This is a methodological gift because durations are always 
available to us at any moment in the life of an infrastructure 
since no infrastructure is born completely anew without 
embedded legacies and histories.  
Finally, what I wish to draw attention to here is that the 
nature of negotiation across the tensions of lifetimes is such 
that what is negotiated is not only alignment for the sake of 
coordination but for the sake of conviviality. What does it 
mean for the material, infrastructural, biographical, and 
institutional rhythms not only be aligned but to be livable 
and sustainable for the foreseeable future? These 
negotiations do not just take place in time but across time – 
for example negotiating across generational gaps and 
paradigmatic gaps. This too is a form of invisible labor, of 
working to time various forms of labor to each other, such 
that they might break gracefully together.  
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Many thanks to the anonymous reviewers whose responses 
improved this work greatly. This work also benefited from 
insightful comments in early stages of analysis and writing 
from Lilly Irani, Steve Jackson, Max Liboiron and Naja 
Holten Møller. This work could not have been completed 
without the open dialogue and mentorship into which I was 
welcomed by my interlocutors at the Mission and by the 
collaborative engagements of the Spaceteams Research 
Group led by Janet Vertesi and including Paul Dourish, 
Melissa Mazmanian, Matthew Bietz, and David Reinecke. 
This work was supported by NSF Socio-Computational 
Systems Grant #0968616. 
REFERENCES 
1. Eric P.S. Baumer, Phil Adams, Vera D. 
Khovanskaya, et al. 2013. Limiting, leaving, and 
(re)lapsing. Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference 
on Human Factors in Computing Systems - CHI 
‘13, ACM Press, 3257–3266.  
2. Matthew J. Bietz, Toni Ferro, and Charlotte P. Lee. 
2012. Sustaining the development of 
cyberinfrastructure: an organization adapting to 
change. Proceedings of the ACM 2012 conference 
on Computer Supported Cooperative Work, ACM, 
901–910.  
3. Eli Blevis. 2007. Sustainable interaction design: 
invention & disposal, renewal & reuse. Proceedings 
of the SIGCHI conference on Human factors in 
computing systems - CHI ‘07, 503.  
4. Geoffrey C. Bowker and Susan Leigh Star. 2000. 
Sorting Things Out: Classification and Its 
Consequences. MIT Press.  
5. Graham Button and Wes Sharrock. 1994. 
Occasioned practices in the work of software 
engineers. Requirements engineering, 217.  
6. Paul Dourish. 2003. The Appropriation of 
Interactive Technologies: Some Lessons from 
Placeless Documents. Computer Supported 
Cooperative Work (CSCW) 12, 4, 465–490.  
7. Harold Garfinkel and Harvey Sacks. 1970. On 
formal structures of practical actions. Appleton-
Century-Crofts, Educational Division. 
8. Stephen Graham and Nigel Thrift. 2007. Out of 
Order: Understanding Repair and Maintenance. 
Theory, Culture & Society 24, 3, 1–25.  
9. Donna J. Haraway. 2003. The companion species 
manifesto: Dogs, people, and significant otherness. 
Prickly Paradigm Press, Chicago.  
10. Sampsa Hyysalo and Janne Lehenkari. 2002. 
Contextualizing Power in a Collaborative Design 
Project. Participatory Design Conference. 
11. Steven J Jackson. 2014. Rethinking repair: 
breakdown, maintenance and repair in media and 
technology studies today. In Media technologies: 
Essays on communication, materiality, and society. 
MIT Press. 
1522
SESSION: MUSEUMS AND PUBLIC SPACES
12. Steven J. Jackson and Lee Kang. 2014. Breakdown, 
obsolescence and reuse: HCI and the art of repair. 
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human 
Factors in Computing Systems, ACM, 449–458.  
13. Steven J. Jackson, Alex Pompe, and Gabriel 
Krieshok. 2012. Repair Worlds: Maintenance, 
Repair, and ICT for Development in Rural 
Namibia. Proceedings of the ACM 2012 Conference 
on Computer Supported Cooperative Work, ACM, 
107–116.  
14. Steven J. Jackson, David Ribes, Ayse Buyuktur, 
and Geoffrey C. Bowker. 2011. Collaborative 
rhythm: temporal dissonance and alignment in 
collaborative scientific work. Proceedings of the 
ACM 2011 conference on Computer supported 
cooperative work’, ACM Press, 245–254.  
15. Helena Karasti and Karen S. Baker. 2004. 
Infrastructuring for the long-term: ecological 
information management. Proceedings of the 37th 
Annual Hawaii International Conference on System 
Sciences, 1–10.  
16. Charlotte P. Lee. 2005. Between Chaos and 
Routine: Boundary Negotiating Artifacts in 
Collaboration. ECSCW 2005, 1–21.  
17. Leah Maestri and Ron Wakkary. 2011. 
Understanding repair as a creative process of 
everyday design. Proceedings of the 8th ACM 
conference on Creativity and cognition, ACM, 81–
90.  
18. Melissa Mazmanian, Marisa Leavitt Cohn, and Paul 
Dourish. 2014. Dynamic reconfiguration in 
planetary exploration: a sociomaterial 
ethnography." MIS Quarterly 38, 3, 831–848.  
19. William Odom, James Pierce, Erik Stolterman, and 
Eli Blevis. 2009. Understanding why we preserve 
some things and discard others in the context of 
interaction design. Proceedings of the 27th 
international conference on Human factors in 
computing systems - CHI 09, 1053.  
20. Julian E. Orr. 1998. Images of Work. Science, 
Technology, & Human Values 23, 4, 439–455.  
21. Neil Pollock and Robin Williams. 2010. e-
Infrastructures: How Do We Know and Understand 
Them? Strategic Ethnography and the Biography of 
Artefacts. Computer Supported Cooperative Work 
(CSCW) 19, 6: 521–556 
22. Madhu Reddy and Paul Dourish. 2011. A Finger on 
the Pulse  : Temporal Rhythms and Information 
Seeking in Medical Work. Proceedings of the ACM 
2011 conference on Computer supported 
cooperative work, ACM, 344–353. 
23. David Ribes and Thomas A. Finholt. 2007. 
Tensions across the scales: planning infrastructure 
for the long-term. Proceedings of the 2007 
international ACM conference on Supporting group 
work, ACM, 229–238.  
24. Daniela K. Rosner, Steven J. Jackson, and Garnet 
Hertz. 2013. Reclaiming repair: maintenance and 
mending as methods for design. CHI’13 Extended 
Abstracts on Human Factors in Computing 
Systems, ACM, 3311–3314.  
25. Benjamin Sims and Christopher R. Henke. 2012. 
Repairing credibility: Repositioning nuclear 
weapons knowledge after the Cold War. Social 
Studies of Science 42, 3, 324–347.  
26. Benjamin Sims. 2009. A Sociotechnical Framework 
for Understanding Infrastructure Breakdown and 
Repair. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
Society of Social Studies of Science. 
http://public.lanl.gov/bsims/ 
27. Susan Leigh Star and Anselm L. Strauss. 1999. 
Layers of Silence, Arenas of Voice: The Ecology of 
Visible and Invisible Work. Computer-Supported 
Cooperative Work: The Journal of Collaborative 
Computing 8, 1–2, 9-30. 
28. Stephanie B Steinhardt and Steven J. Jackson. 
2014. Reconciling Rhythms  : Plans and Temporal 
Alignment in Collaborative Scientific Work. 
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on 
Computer supported cooperative work & social 
computing, ACM, 134–145. 
29. Lucy A. Suchman. 1987. Plans and Situated 
Actions: The Problem of Human-Machine 
Communication. Cambridge University Press.  
30. Bill Tomlinson, Michael Silberman, and Don 
Patterson. 2012. Collapse informatics: Augmenting 
the sustainability & ICT4D discourse in HCI. CHI 
‘12 Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on 
Human Factors in Computing Systems, 655–664.  
31. Sharon Traweek. 1992. Beamtimes and Lifetimes. 
Harvard University Press.  
32. Janet Vertesi. 2008. Seeing like a rover: embodied 
experience on the mars exploration rover mission. 
CHI’08 Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in 
Computing Systems, ACM, 2523–2532.  
33. Janet Vertesi. 2014. Seamful Spaces: 
Heterogeneous Infrastructures in Interaction. 
Science, Technology & Human Values.  
 
1523
CSCW '16, FEBRUARY 27–MARCH2, 2016, SAN FRANCISCO, CA, USA
